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Introduction
At the request of the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) and the Constellation
Program (CxP) Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) Requirements Director, the
NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) participated in the Cx SR&QA Requirements
forum. The Requirements Forum was held June 24-26, 2008, at GRC's Plum Brook Facility. The
forum's purpose was to gather all stakeholders into a focused meeting to help complete the
process of refining the CxP to refine its Level II SR&QA requirements or defining project-
specific requirements tailoring. Element prime contractors had raised specific questions about the
wording and intent of many requirements in areas they felt were driving costs without adding
commensurate value. NESC was asked to provide an independent and thorough review of
requirements that contractors believed were driving Program costs, by active participation in the
forum.
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Overview of Lessons Learned and Recommendations from Forum Splinter Groupsl
Lessons Learned:
— A face-to-face forum discussion between empowered representatives of Program, Project and
Element stakeholders should be held as early as possible before Program-level requirements
are base-lined.
— Effectiveness and efficiency of the entire safety review process can be enhanced by
maintaining consistency in Safety Review Panels' approach and stability in their
membership. This allows expectations to be understood by the design teams and allows the
Panels' technical knowledge to mature along with the design maturity.
Problem Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action (PRACA) Recommendation
— Because the CxP version of "PRACA" is significantly different from previous programs, the
CxP should consider re-naming their nonconformance and corrective action reporting system
to avoid potential difficulties or errors in implementation caused by confusion in terms
stemming from legacy meanings.
Acceptance Data Package (ADP) Recommendation
— To maximize the overall Program safety and reliability, the CxP should actively seek
perspectives from the Cx Projects (who are responsible for hardware design and delivery) on
those items of highest potential for maximizing their element's safety and reliability.
Reliability & Maintainability Recommendations
— To avoid potential confusion between the list of critical items (a product) and the risk
evaluation/analysis processes, the CxP SR&QA should change the lexicon of the currently-
used "CIL" to distinguish the FMEA-derived List from the data collection/ evaluation/
assessment Process.
— To provide accurate Program risk assessments, CxP SR&QA should maintain FMEA(s) and
Critical Items Lists for all items in each subsystem and system.
— To more accurately compare and balance risks across the entire Program, CxP SR&QA
should ensure that the risk Likelihood and Consequence (also called Impact or Severity)
rankings are applied uniformly across all Projects/Elements and sub tier suppliers.
Splinter Groups with no Recommendations are not included.
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General Observations
The forum was very productive and was a major step forward in the on-going SR&QA process
of aligning the requirements throughout the Program and reducing the Program costs, compared
to the original SR&QA requirements baseline. The face-to-face interaction among involved
parties (Program, Projects, Elements, Suppliers, and Independent Observers) resulted in faster
communication and a better understanding of the issues. The prime contractors were well
represented in all sessions and did a good job identifying cost-drivers prior to the forum, evident
by the number of items they had submitted to the discussion matrix. They were candid in the
sessions and provided honest discussions of benefits and risks of existing Space Shuttle Program
(SSP) and International Space Station (ISS) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) systems.
Their openness and team player attitude contributed greatly to a better understanding of the
Program's needs and expectations, versus potential costs of meeting those needs and
expectations. The NASA Project SR&QA representatives also were fully engaged in the splinter
sessions and with Team Zero. In general, the forum provided many effective resolutions of open
discussion items and the NESC concurred with the outcomes, unless noted in the following
position paper. Lesson Learned: A face-to face forum discussion between empowered
representatives of Program, Project, and Element stakeholders should be held as early as
possible before Program-level requirements are base-liner.
The Program-level SR&QA attitude coming into the splinter sessions seemed to be geared
toward top-down detail and control, even though the splinter groups were told that CxP is
"project centric". The desire for Level II information access without contact with Levels III and
IV was a frequently recurring theme. This, in part, was attributed to the reported plan for
reduced sustaining engineering at Levels III and IV. It also appeared that review and cross
checking of draft documents within Level II, and by Levels III and IV, was still on-going. This
was evident by the large number of forum items being readily resolved and the forward work
needed to clarify sections of the retained requirements. Significant time was directed towards
resolving confusion or conflict in the definition of nomenclature. As an example, protracted
discussion detracted from the Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (PFMEA) splinter due
to interpretation of the terms "special" and "critical" processes. These differences persisted from
prior meetings and generally were not resolved at this meeting.
One general finding is that some of the Level II requirements were unclear or too prescriptive in
nature. As a guiding principle, Program-level SR&QA requirements should address the desired
outcomes while Project-level requirements should address the specifics of implementation.
Several examples are described in more detail in subsequent sections of this white paper,
including: using a PRACA system as the single problem reporting system versus the desire to
have a single compilation of all the elements/projects nonconformance reports; the detailed
content of a deliverable's ADP versus the desire to utilize data for higher level trending and
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analysis; the frequency of vendor audits versus the desire to have an auditable vendor audit
program; and prescribing PFMEA as a requirement versus the desire to implement process
control. The forum was successfiil in providing the dialogue leading to a common understanding
of the Program's desired outcomes with appropriate changes to the requirements documents to
more clearly define what is expected of the Projects and Elements without prescribing how to
implement Level II requirements.
A focus on cost-cutting activities surfaced throughout the review. Cutting unnecessary costs is an
admirable goal; however, each individual reduction in activity must be assessed as to its effect on
the whole Program. As a balance, the Team Zero reminded the Splinter Groups that, in general,
SR&QA does not cost money, it saves money. Injuries, mishaps, quality slips and system
problems found late in the schedule are the real cost drivers for the Program. It is important to
recognize that a design decision, made to optimize one parameter (such as performance), may
also increase overall system vulnerability to quality problems or critical failures. In protecting
against these system vulnerabilities, costs seemingly attributable to SR&QA should really be
considered part of the total cost of the particular design choice. The forum was very valuable in
raising awareness of efficiency in SR&QA activities, without going too far.
Judiciously applying SR&QA effort where it does the most good is necessary to ensure that
safety and reliability are adequately addressed across the whole Program. It is hard to create a
one size fits all sets of SR&QA requirements at Level II that will guarantee the appropriate result
at the hardware and software item elements controlled by Level III and IV requirements. To
assure that the Program gets the most "bang for their buck", the requirements at Levels II, III,
and below should be tailored to match the chosen system design to attack the risk drivers. Until
this is done it will be premature to declare a "pencils down" state for the requirements. In
summary, it was necessary and very productive to hold the SR&QA Requirements Form as a
face-to-face meeting (and the choice of remote location also was beneficial) to rapidly clarify
and negotiate issues identified in the draft Level II SR&QA documents. Overall, the SR&QA
Forum was successfid in aligning all stakeholders and facilitating rapid information transfer.
NESC participation provided added value in discussions by providing independent expertise and
domain knowledge, and by facilitating the removal of any impasse, as needed.
Comments on specific Splinter Group discussions follow.
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Discussion of the Problem Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action (PRACA) Splinter
Group:
(NESC POCs: Robert J. Beil, Stephen A. Minute, Michael D. Smiles)
The PRACA splinter group had good cross-functional participation from the prime contractors
and Projects. Broad consensus was reached, dealing with 47 comments, 35 of which were
unique (non-duplicates), 6 were withdrawn, and 2 were elevated for further deliberation with
Team Zero. One of the elevated items was a comment to CxP 70059 (Safety, Reliability and
Quality Assurance Requirements) relating to the existence of a Program-level Material Review
Board (MRB) function. A second comment was to CxP 70068 (PRACA Requirements, volumes
1-3) relating to PRACA reporting criteria.
The 47 comments were broken into the six categories: Single System, Reporting Criteria,
Processes, Technical--MRB, and Miscellan eons. Out of the above breakdown, there were 4
primary topics of interest: the first three related to PRACA reporting criteria and the fourth
regarding the existence of Program level MRB. The primary topics were as follows:
• Use of a single problem reporting system
• Whether all data or a limited subset should be entered into PRACA (for instance, SSP
and IS  Programs limited contractor reporting to a subset of material review items)
• When during the lifecycle should the prime contractors data delivery commence (i.e.,
starting with acceptance testing, post-CDR, etc.)
• Whether the CxP should have a MRB or delegate this function in its entirety to the
Projects
1.	 Regarding the PRACA reporting criteria, there was little disagreement regarding the use
of a single PRACA system. Generally, Ares contractors were in agreement with
establishing an interface to their internal nonconformance database(s) given that they are
allowed to maintain their records in their internal system and that NASA will pull data on
a regular basis into the single NASA PRACA system. Ground, Crew Exploration
Vehicle (CEV) and Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) Projects were also
supportive of a single PRACA system. Pulling the data into NASA PRACA will
necessitate the development of a `filter' that maps data fields (from each contractor
and/or Project nonconformance and corrective action reporting system) into the
appropriate Level II PRACA fields. Ideally this will be an electronic interface and will
be a one time development for each. This is particularly important as the agreement
reached at the Level `0' board is to include all nonconfornance data in PRACA,
including anything ranging from minor nonconformances to material review items. The
prime contractors agreed that since they are already collecting this data electronically,
this is not a significant cost impact in terms of the transfer of the data.
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2. There are residual concerns regarding transfer of all nonconformance data. These include
the cost impacts associated with addressing the same questions, from multiple NASA
offices to contractor staff, on problem status and actions (failure to follow the chain of
command) and concerns about time spent chasing perceived issues due to uninformed
evaluators "second guessing" the contractor's actions with respect to analysis, causal
analysis, corrective actions and other data posted in CxP PRACA. There are also
concerns about an "apples to oranges" comparison of different contractors, and that data
entered into the system will be used to punish contractors.
3. The third topic of interest regarding PRACA reporting criteria revolves around when the
Program should start to collect data and was mostly due to confusing wording in the
requirements. These questions were clarified, with the agreement that the start of data
collection would be post-CDR for hardware or start of Acceptance Validation and
Verification for software.
The resolutions reached during the forum pertaining to the first three topics listed above
make the CxP version of PRACA significantly different from previous programs.
Because the CxP version of "PRACA" is significantly different fr orn previous
programs, the CxP should consider re-naming their nonconformance and corrective
action reporting system to avoid potential difficulties or errors in implementation
caused by confusion in terms stemming from legacy meanings.
4. The final major topic discussed was the need for a limited Program level MRB. This is
an issue between the Program and the Projects. Other large NASA Programs (in
particular SSP and ISS) have Program level MRBs, usually at the hardware integration
level, that are put in place to address significant issues that change the level of risk being
accepted by the Program with a particular material review. Team Zero assigned an action
to further study this item.
Discussion of the Acceptance Data Package (ADP) Splinter Group:
(NESC POC: Charles F. Schafer, Steven J. Gentz)
Observations concerning the Cx SR&QA requirements for ADP include:
The data required in a Cx ADP were described generally in para. 1.0 of Cx 70146 as
"The ADP provides a complete and verified status, including the as-built configuration,
of hardware or software,  contains information pertinent to acceptance, identifr.es
information unique to the item, and enables the continuation of required activities by the
rising organization. The ADP is prepared as part of the hardware or software
acceptance/delivery criteria and will be maintained throughout the hardware or software
life cycle after government acceptance. " Given this definition, it seems clear that the
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ADPs are provided as part of the contracts that each Project or Element has with the
suppliers. Many of these contracts are already in place. Changes to the deliverables
under these contracts may be expected to change cost. The discussions in the ADP
splinter sessions led to specific language in individual requirements clarifying the role of
the Projects in defining the content of the ADPs (for example, ADP-13-7 and ADP-B-6).
2. There was a mismatch between the Levels III and IV understandings of an ADP versus
the Level II desired concept of ADP. A typical ADP as viewed by Levels III and IV is a
discrete static data set deliverable applicable to a subcomponent, component, element,
and/or system. The Level II concept was to use ADP as an online system able to archive,
retrieve, compare, trend, and report data from a variety of like items. Cx 70146 does not
try to define implementation requirements for an electronic Cx required ADPs.
Paragraph 1.2 (page 8) explains that this will be done in a separate document. In spite of
this, there was a great deal of discussion initially in the ADP splinter session about the
need to connect the implementation requirements with the product to be delivered. One
source of debate was the requirement for electronic signatures. The suppliers saw this as
an additional requirement over their contractual requirements. Ultimately it was agreed
that the Cx SR&QA requirement would be satisfied by a scanned document (pdf format).
3. The use of the terms "ADP report" and "query" also generated extensive discussion.
These terms apparently implied to the suppliers that additional deliveries of data were
being required over which they had planned and were contracted by the Project/Elements
to provide. In these cases, the issue was primarily that repeated deliveries of data already
ADP deliverable seemed to be implied. Para. 4.1 requires that `ADP providers shall not
deliver- duplicate acceptance data when that information alread y exists in other CxP
databases, which ar-e under CxP configuration management [CxP-SRQA-ADP-0012].
These issues generally were ultimately resolved consistent with this requirement (no
duplication of delivery).
4. The issue of what documentation must be text searchable versus what is only desirable
was not completely resolved. This is an open issue to be resolved per the following:
"Develop table of mandatory text-searchable data elements. Also conduct ADP Face-to-
Face with appropriate project representation, including data providers and end-users of
the acceptance data (e.g., Engineering). " Cost impacts of this are pending completion of
this "Tiger Team" activity. The charge to the supplier team (in developing data which
will be used in the face-to-face activity) is to assess their data elements to determine
which of three categories they fall under:
• Data that can be provided in a text-searchable native format.
• Data which is typed and can be scanned using Optical Character Recognition
(OCR) software.
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Data which is handwritten and is, therefore, more complicated to convert into a
text-searchable format (i.e., data has complex character recognition challenges if
OCR software is used to convert it). Although additional work is required for
resolution, the establishment of the "Tiger Team" and the data categorization
process should provide a rational means for determining additional data
requirements (if any) and their cost impacts.
5.	 During the discussions of ADP Requirements, a specific illustrative example was
presented in side discussions with the First Stage Project Manager. In this system,
knowledge of the propellant grain integrity, insulation integrity, and the integrity of bond
lines between propellant and insulation strongly affects the ability to understand the
safety and reliability of a solid rocket motor. Radiography is used to detect voids and
open un-bonds for propellant and insulation in solid motors. Radiographic coverage of
the redesigned solid rocket motor (RSRM) has historically been about 30 percent,
however, coverage of 100 percent is possible, desirable, and represents industry best
practice. As pointed out by the First Stage Project Manager, combining 100 percent
radiographic coverage with a move to digital imaging could reduce costs to the Project.
Additionally, other methods exist to observe cracks or un-bonds that are not open (no
void exists). Application of one of these methods (i.e., an acoustic method) to
characterization of the solid motor propellant and insulation integrity could further assure
that a given motor is safe to fly. As this SRM example suggests, the teams closest to the
design and delivery of the hardware are often in the best position to consider relative
added value for test data (per unit cost). To maximize the overall Program safety and
reliability, the CxP should actively seek perspectives froin the Cx Projects (who are
responsible for hardware design and delivery) on those items of highest potential for
maximizing their element's safety and reliability.
Discussion of the Software Assurance Plan (SAP) (CxP 70128, Baseline, Release Date:
August 23, 2007) Splinter Group:
(NESC POC: Steven S. Scott)
The CxP SAP was reviewed independently outside the participation of the forum. Observations
concerning the SAP include:
The document is written at a very high-level and contains numerous generalities and
"boiler plate" statements. However, it is generally acceptable for a high-level assurance
plan. The Software Assurance life cycle plans also seem reasonable enough, but they are
largely motherhood. In particular, the SAP does not address any automated tools that
Software Assurance will use to accomplish its work. It is not clear whether there is any
standardization in this area.
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2. Section 1.2, first paragraph, third sentence, page 5 of 42 says this plan applies to
computer programs for "Complex Electronics." This ambiguous term is not generally nor
widely accepted. Software Assurance has used it as a term for programmable logic
hardware devices that are not computer software like Field Programmable Gate-Arrays
(FPGAs), Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), etc. If this term is intended in
this use to mean software that runs on embedded processors that are instantiated (i.e.,
implemented, physically realized) on programmable logic devices, then it makes sense
for software assurance to be responsible for monitoring it. If it refers to the functional
programming of the hardware devices themselves, then this would be the responsibility
of digital logic designers and hardware assurance engineers as software assurance
principles have limited application in this area. Similarly, the term "firmware" has
become so ambiguous that the IEEE Glossary of Software Engineering Terms advises
against its use. It is used to mean software code or data stored on a programmable device,
which could be changed. Now it can mean almost anything.
3. The Glossary of Terms, Section A2.0, page 34 of 42, does not include the terms
"Complex Electronics" nor "firmware. This is probably because of the ambiguity and
confusion surrounding these terms. (It does, however, include such minor terms as
"Oversight," on which it places great emphasis.)
4. Many sections of the SAP contain statements that say "The Provider Software Assurance
Manager will..." These statements are "pseudo" requirements. Requirements do not
belong in a SAP but in a requirements document or specification. It is not clear that
anyone will actually look in the SAP for requirements or even acknowledge that they are
contractually obligated to follow "will" statements in a SAP. These are basically
requirements that have no power of enforcement. They are requirements masquerading as
implementation details.
5. Section 4.2.3, Software Reliability, page 18 of 42: Most of this section consists of the
same thought repeated over several pages. It is clear that NASA does not have a very
clear idea of what should be done and what will be acceptable in this area. Much of this is
an attempt to extrapolate the well-developed principles of hardware reliability into the
realm of software without much guidance or direction on how exactly to do this. Some
specifics are:
• Page 18 of 42, Section 4.2.3, first paragraph, sentence two states: "The emphasis
for Software Reliability is a qualitative measure." This seems somewhat self-
contradictory but it illustrates a weakness that NASA is not very good at
quantifying software reliability.
• Page 19 of 42, Section 4.2.3.1, item g says: the Acquirer Software Assurance
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Manager will "summarize and elevate software reliability issues and findings to
the CxP SR&QA Director", but doesn't give any indication of what these kinds of
things might be or how they will recognize a software reliability issue. The entire
section is filled with such vagaries and generalities.
Page 20 of 42, Section 4.2.3.1, item h enumerates a whole list of things the
Provider Software Assurance Manager will provide. There are no details or
guidance on what NASA expects for items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. These are terms from the
hardware reliability discipline and it is not evident that NASA knows any
specifics about what it wants or expects in the area of reliability modeling for
software, reliability allocations for software, reliability predictions for software,
etc. Will Software Assurance Managers recognize these things when they see
them'?
6.	 Page 30 of 42, Section 6.0, Software Assurance Program Metrics: This entire section
is very vague. Almost anything satisfies it. There are very few specific examples
(four, to be exact) of what NASA is expecting in the way of metrics. Since only four
are "specified" (remember, this is not a requirements document), then those four are
probably the only ones NASA will get. In some cases, the Acquirer Software
Assurance Manager is obligated to prepare metrics from data it has not specifically
requested and may not get from the Provider Software Assurance Manager (see page
30 of 42, paragraph 2, items a through e).
In conclusion, the CxP SAP is generally acceptable for a high-level assurance plan.
Discussion of the Reliability & Maintainability Splinter Group:
(NESC POCs: Cynthia Null, Walter Thomas III)
Specific observations and recommendations concerning the Reliability and Maintainability
Splinter Group include the following:
Most of the Reliability and Maintainability Splinter Group discussion centered on relationships
between Hazard Reports and other SR&QA products, especially FMEA/CILs. The following
five fundamental questions were covered at various times during the extended sessions:
Terminology differences between products and processes, stemming from past usage in
legacy programs
• The value of retaining two independent processes with differing approaches, top-down
and bottom-up, to ensure all hazards are recognized and evaluated
Completeness in applying risk assessment processes and the consequent danger of
reducing the set of items considered — that is, "ground-ruling out" some items
NESC Request No.: 08-00476
0 NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#:RP-08-86 Version:1.0Report
Title: Page #:
Review of the Constellation Level II SR&QA Requirements Documents 13 of 19during Participation in the Constellation Level II SR&QA Forum
• The need for accurate likelihood of occurrence quantification by including reliability-
engineering expertise in assessment teams
• The importance of integrating risk assessments across the entire Program and supply
chain, to provide consistent data for risk mitigation activities
While progress was made during the forum, a follow-up "Tiger Team" has been assigned to
review and resolve the "FMEA/CIL" and Hazard Report/Analysis Level II requirements issues
identified at the forum in both splinter group and Team Zero discussions.
Throughout the splinter meeting, there was continuous discussion centered on differing
interpretations of the term "CIL." These interpretations derive from historical usage in
past programs. In that heritage context, "CIL" has two meanings: (a) a list of critical
items (derived from the FMEA and having Crit 1 or 2 severity/criticality); and (b) the
process to research and provide rationale for using these Crit 1 and 2 items in spaceflight
applications. Shuttle-derived usage of "CILs" means gathering, compiling, and assessing
all relevant data for detailed analyses concerning a "CIL-listed-item." A first step to
clarify these differing interpretations is to divorce "CIL" (the Critical Item List) from the
subsequent assessment/analysis-process, and rename the process to, for example,
"Critical Item Safety Analysis". This will distinguish the list from the process. By
renaming the process, another distinction is made from the fonner Shuttle process. This
will be especially important if the process used to produce the CxP "Critical Item Safety
Report" is implemented using a method different than the existing Shuttle method. To
avoid potential confusion between the list of critical items (a product) and the risk
evaluation/analysis processes, the CxP SR&QA should change the lexicon of the
currently-used "CIL" to distinguish the FMEA-derived List from the data
collectioiilei yalitatioiilassessnient Process.
2.	 Considerable discussion ensued about the overlap between "doing a CIL" (the "process,"
see above) and generating a Hazard Report, and whether these processes are duplicative
tasks. FMEA is a "bottoms up" and Hazard Report a "top down" approach. Each provides
the Projects with an independent risk assessment for the same critical item(s) or
element(s), from different points of view. Thus they are checks - one against the other.
The two analyses currently are performed by separate groups or organizations. (In one
Team Zero presentation it was stated there were "FMEA/CIL empires" and "Hazard
empires" — the words used by one senior manager). Some splinter participants stated that
perfonning both is duplicative. One contractor proposed performing either one or the
other (i.e., Critical item evaluation or Hazard Report) to reduce costs. Other inputs
suggested these analyses currently are executed by "re-labeling" the corresponding
analysis' cover sheet. This latter practice defeats the reason for performing both —
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independent analyses of the same critical item(s) to assure identified risk(s) have been
assessed accurately.
Collaboratively involving those persons responsible for each analysis — particularly in the
"research" or "data collection" phases for the corresponding analyses — could provide
potential efficiencies for the Program. The same "basis inforniation" would be applied for
both the "bottoms-up" (Critical item evaluation) and "top-down" (Hazard Report).
Researching these data collaboratively could reduce expended effort versus performing
this data gathering independently. Furthermore, the collaborative approach would serve
as a "real time" check and balance which would avoid subsequent dissention regarding
the basis data. The two analytical techniques are then applied to the given item/subsystem
being evaluated. A subsequent collaborative comparison of respective results will verify
whether the risk ranks for the two analyses correspond. That is, if the bottoms-up and
top-down analyses reach the same conclusion regarding mission risk impact(s), the
analyses and the assigned risk are credible. If not, both analyses need to be reconciled to
determine why equivalent "risk rankings" were not obtained.
These "concurrently engineered" Critical item evaluation and Hazard Reports would be
performed at the lowest indenture level deemed appropriate by Level III requirements.
This bottoms-up and top-down approach to evaluating and ranking the risks for human
spaceflight systems provides the "checks" mentioned above. Once the Level III
independent assessments are deemed credible, the data from the two analyses (for each
item) can then be combined into one document (or other applicable data structure) with a
summary page or paragraph ("Cover sheet"). Then, this would become the basis data for
higher level risk assessments and integration (that is, at Level III/Project and then to
Level II/Program). This enables the Projects and Program to integrate and assess all
mission critical risks. Another potential advantage of this collaborative assessment
process is that the risk Likelihood and Consequence (also called Impact or Severity)
rankings can be more uniformly applied across
-
all
-
Projects and sub tier suppliers so the
"risk roll-ups" at both Project and Program levels are accurate and not an "apples to
oranges" comparison.
3.	 A lengthy debate about the depth of applying "FMEA/CILs" occurred. Contractors
supported limiting some items to be included in FMEAs, e.g. structures. Also, there was
discussion about "ground-riling out" certain items off the FMEA. The splinter group
eventually reached consensus that it was appropriate for an FMEA to be a complete
listing of all hardware items with their respective criticality/severity categories
enumerated. However, there may be pressure to relax the requirement for completeness,
since the CEV redesign increased the projected percentage of "Crit 1 and 2" items from
about 40 to 90 percent of their total hardware items. In the main, it is the change to a
single string design that increases the percentage of items in an FMEA. Arbitrarily
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reducing the number, by limiting or "ground-ruling out" FMEA items, is not consistent
with reliable systems design. If some items are to be analyzed by other means or
"ground-ruled out", then those facts should be recorded in the remarks section of the
FMEA to so indicate. At the conclusion of the meeting, there was agreement that both
FMEAs and Critical Items Lists (CILs) are needed. To provide accurate Program risk
assessments, CxP SR&QA should maintain FMEA(s) and Critical Items Lists for all
items in each subsystem and system.
4. It was observed that reliability engineering expertise was not initially included as part of
the planned FMEA/CIL — Hazard Report "Tiger Team". That is, the stated resolution
team make-up did not call for reliability engineering participation. Risk likelihood
(probability) quantification will play an important role in discussing these outstanding
Level II issues. FMEA/CILs, Critical Item Evaluations, and Hazard Reports all are
perfonned to support CxP risk assessments and require understanding risk likelihoods
(probabilities) and the associated methodologies for deriving them; this can be provided
by reliability engineering. A recommendation to include quantitative reliability
participation in the Tiger Team was made and acknowledged as appropriate by the
splinter group.
5. With multiple teams and suppliers creating FMEAs, Critical Item Evaluations, and
Hazards Reports, the task of integrating Program-level risks and the processes of
identification/assessment/management will be challenging. FMEAs and Hazard Reports
need to be integrated vertically along the supply chain and horizontally across the various
FMEA/CIL, Critical Item Evaluation, Hazard Report, and PRA analyses. These analyses
need to be consistent among each other and reinforce each other to provide a
Programmatic risk profile that assesses and resolves risk drivers using a coordinated
approach. To more accurately compare and balance risks across the entire Program,
CxP SR&QA should ensure that the risk Likelihood and Consequence (also called
Impact or Severity) rankings are applied uniformly across all Projects/Elements and
sub tier suppliers.
Discussion of the Surveillance Splinter Group:
(NESC POCs: Michael D. Smiles, Steve J. Gentz, Stephen A. Minute)
The results of the Surveillance splinter group session were good, but limited, as the surveillance
activity was not fully developed. There is a Level II vision to develop a Surveillance Plan based
on a three-prong approach consisting of audits, Government Mandatory Inspection Points
(GMIP), and surveillance. Only an incomplete draft of the surveillance prong was presented.
The audit and GMIP aspects have not been developed. This splinter group was not able to
outbrief Team Zero due to time constraints at Plum Brook, but did present their results at a
meeting on July 2, 2008.
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Most issues were worked out without a lot of extensive debate. One example of requirements
clarifications was the agreement to remove the 24-month vendor audit period. This was replaced
with a Level II requirement for the generation of a Level III Project/Element specific vendor
audit plan which would identify explicit review periods.
Much of the surveillance process has been under development by a CxP Government
Surveillance Working Group. As part of this effort, a NESC member participated in a CxP
Surveillance Strategy meeting at JSC the last week of May 2008, which resulted in the
establishment of the CxP Government Surveillance Working Group. The working group is
trying to implement the philosophy adopted from the strategy meeting. The CxP Surveillance
Government Working Group and associated splinter groups appear to be working towards the
development of the proposed Surveillance Plan. The schedule associated with finalizing the
Surveillance Plan was not discussed at the Plum Brook meeting, but requires coordination with
the CxP SR&QA community to ensure timely and coordinated review and approval.
One concern discussed during the splinter group session was for the Level II requirement to have
an electronic closed loop tracking system for GMIP. The CxP has developed a system to record
GMIPs and has provided it to the Government personnel performing inspections for evaluation.
This developmental system is a database distinctly separate from the contractor build records of
the flight hardware and software. The population of this system is envisioned to be a NASA
responsibility utilizing Government inspection resources. The inherent risks and costs associated
with this concept, including potential contractor costs and risks, may not yet be recognized and
could require extensive programmatic trades.
This splinter group session represented the lowest maturity level of the forum topics covered
with only the partial development of the proposed Surveillance Plan. The CxP Government
Surveillance Working Group appears to recognize the significant challenges necessary to
complete this effort.
Discussion of the Process Control Splinter Group:
(NESC POCs: Stephen A. Minute, Steven J. Gentz)
There were two areas of contention for the Process Control splinter group. The splinter group
could not converge on the definition of critical process, and there were concerns that the Program
was being too prescriptive in requiring PFMEAs for critical processes at the project and
contractor level. The splinter group understood and agreed on the intent of the requirement, but
disagreed on the stipulation of a specific process to be used. PFMEA is a particular methodology
for assessing potential failure points within a process. There are other tools and methods for
doing similar assessments. As an example, Statistical Process Control (SPC) is also another best
practice manufacturing tool, but like PFMEA should not be imposed. The contractors are already
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using variants in their current programs. Re-scoping the requirement to more succinctly capture
the "what" is intended, and removing the "how" language is preferred. Allowing tailoring by the
Projects would also be valuable.
The splinter group also discussed an apparent attempt in the requirements to augment the "how
to" requirement with a threshold of "when to" apply to Level IV processes. This was attempted
by the introduction of a CxP 70055 unique definition of "critical" processes. No consensus
could be reached due to the diversity of prior program experiences using varying definitions for
"special" and "critical" processes.
Discussion of the Contamination Splinter Group:
(NESC POC: Stephen A. Minute)
Although the Contamination splinter group was small, there was very good discussion. It was
obvious that the majority involved had discussed the issues before this meeting and were already
in the process of revising the document with redlines received and agreed to by the splinter
group. The splinter group was missing one of the industry partners in the initial splinter group
meeting due to conflicting splinter sessions. However, the splinter group was able to tag-up with
that team member and resolve the inputs to everyone's satisfaction.
There were no significant issues. The greatest discussion centered around concerns where
requirements were too prescriptive. In particular, requirements to double-bag and seal clean
hardware (in clean rooms) and lighting and distance requirements for Visual Clean (VC)
inspections. The language was adjusted to allow appropriate flexibility without sacrificing
technical intent. Most of the inputs were addressed by clarification of the requirements via notes
to better explain intent.
Discussion of the Hazard Analysis Methodology Splinter Group:
(NESC POC: Nancy J. Currie)
The Hazard Analysis Methodology splinter group was relatively small with representation from
the Program Office, NASA SR&QA organizations supporting Constellation, and Contractor
representatives. One of the most significant discussions centered on the relationship between
hazard reports and other SR&QA products, especially FMEA/CILs. These discussions have
been captured in the Reliability & Maintainability Splinter portion of this report.
Other significant issues that were discussed include level of failure tolerance and definition of
design for minimum risk (DFMR), inclusion of descriptions of planned survival methods in
hazard reports, and the phasing and timing of safety reviews.
Failure Tolerance: The current requirement for failure tolerance reads: "The level of
failure tolerance should be commensurate with the severity of the hazard and the
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likelihood of occurrence." Most of the discussions of this topic involved the potential
ambiguity of this major design requirement. Both NASA SR&QA and contractor
systems safety personnel were concerned that the ambiguous wording of the requirement
might lead to various interpretations of this requirement by CSERP members and
chairpersons. Further, some in attendance interpreted the wording of this requirement to
mean that failure tolerance should be increased until the risk is at Low or Very Low.
After much discussion and debate, there was no resolution reached and was elevated to a
Team Zero discussion.
The Team Zero discussion revolved around the single failure tolerance requirement
captured in the CARD. This question misinterprets the intent of the Human Rating
Requirements Revision B that stipulates a minimum of 1 failure tolerance. The intent of
the Human Rating Requirements was for the Level II team to look at the whole program
and have the design team (e.g. Projects and Elements) provide the rationale for why their
system is acceptable. The onus is on the design team (e.g. Projects and Elements) and not
the Program SR&QA to decide where failure tolerance is necessary. An integrated risk
assessment should be done at the Program level. Designers should always design for
minimum system risk. A two failure tolerance is just one way of minimizing risk. A
complex failure tolerance solution could unintentionally increase risk over a simpler and
safer solution.
2. Planned Crew Survival Methods: The initial requirement stated: "At a minimum, the
planned crew survival methods: Abort, Escape, Emergency Egress, Safe Haven, Rescue,
Emergency JWedical., or None; should be identified, description provided if not evident by
the survival method identified, and reference provided to documentation or analysis that
validates the availability of the survival method identified. " The concern expressed with
this wording was that the CSERP may interpret this to mean that a detailed description of
every instance of crew survival mode must be included in every hazard report, which
would require significant labor hours. Following detailed discussion, this requirement
was modified to alleviate the requirement to provide a detailed description if the survival
method is evident. Further, in cases where crew survival methods are not available,
additional scrutiny will be placed on the robustness and reliability of identified hazard
controls.
3. Timing of Safety Reviews: The initial requirement stated: "The Program shall conduct
phased system safety and mission success reviews prior to each Project and Program
milestone reviews WDR, CDR, SAR). " Safety Review Panel personnel participating
during Project and Element design reviews, as a concurrent engineering practice,
minimizes adverse schedule and cost impacts over the Program's life cycle. The
requirement was modified so that safety and mission success reviews are conducted in
parallel with Project and Program milestone reviews. Further, qualifiers were added to
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state that holding the phased safety review during or after the Projects and Elements
milestone reviews may create some additional schedule and cost risks to the Program.
Lesson Learned. Effectiveness and efficiency of the entire safety review process can be
enhanced by maintaining consistency in Safety Review Panels' approach and stability
in their membership. This allotivs expectations to be understood by the design teams
and allows the Panels' technical knowledge to mature along with the design maturity.
Discussion of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Splinter Group:
(NESC POC: Nancy J. Currie)
The CxP assembled a Probabilistic Risk Management splinter group that includes experts with
significant prior experience in Program-level risk management and PRA. The group is
leveraging lessons learned from prior human spaceflight programs while also advancing and
improving PRA methodologies and practices. The CxP appears to have a sound and reasonable
approach to development, configuration management, and implementation of PRA across all
Program elements. This will greatly assist the CxP and Project Managers in determining their
risk posture throughout the Program's life cycle. In general, there was concurrence on the
methodology, process, and requirements associated with PRA. Comments withdrawn did not
reflect technical content or methodology issues, but rather internal Orion Project management
and roles/responsibilities between NASA and the contractor community.
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